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Hermeneutics and genocide: giving voice to the
unspoken
Shawn Kelley1

ABSTRACT The discipline of philosophical hermeneutics, which has played a crucial role in
the discipline of New Testament studies, is haunted by the Holocaust. While there has been a
great deal of Heidegger scholarship on the interface of Heidegger’s Nazi engagement and his
thought, such scholarly focus has been lacking in the larger ﬁeld of hermeneutics. Current
hermeneutical theorists have not explored the various ways that hermeneutical theorists may
be responding to the Holocaust. This paper seeks to rectify this scholarly lacuna by drawing
attention to what is largely unspoken in hermeneutical theory. My argument examines one
particularly important strain of hermeneutical thinking should be seen as a response to
fascism and genocide: the critique of instrumental rationality. I look at three seminal sets of
scholars: Heidegger, Gadamer and the Frankfurt School. The three sets of thinkers share
remarkably similar views about the ills of modernity and a remarkably similar philosophical
narrative on how these ills came about. In this grand narrative, current political or social
problems are surface symptoms of a deeper spiritual crisis produced by the Enlightenment.
The bulk of the paper consists of a reading of central elements of the thought of Heidegger,
Gadamer and the Frankfurt School. This reading demonstrates that, for each, the critique of
instrumental rationality represents their fundamental approach to confronting fascism and
genocide. In the course of the analysis, I identify the limitations of this approach as both a
ground for an ontological approach to interpretation and a theoretical response to the problems of fascism and genocide. If hermeneutics wishes to confront the Holocaust, then it
needs to allow the Holocaust to become the explicit rather than implicit horizon and, thereby,
to allow the emergence of a new set of questions that will produce a new turn in the
hermeneutical dialogue. This paper is published as part of a thematic collection dedicated to
radical theologies.
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Introduction
or most of the twentieth century, the philosophical
discipline of hermeneutics provided biblical scholarship
with its fundamental theoretical and interpretive foundation. To read the Bible seriously, especially the New Testament,
was to engage with hermeneutics. The purpose of this paper is to
read hermeneutical theory, which has played a crucial part in
New Testament scholarship, as a post-Holocaust and postGenocidal discourse. My claim is that fascism and genocide were
important topics for the formation of hermeneutics, and that
hermeneutics has debated the fundamental nature of fascism and
genocide by way of its critique of Enlightenment and technical
rationality. My claim is a strong one: the hermeneutical debate
about instrumental rationality and the Enlightenment is, among
other things, explicitly about fascism and genocide and was intended
to be so by the major ﬁgures in the ﬁeld. As hermeneutical theory
was translated into the ﬁeld of New Testament studies, its
overt political orientation fell by the wayside. New Testament
scholarship would be wise to revisit the foundations of hermeneutical theory.
I will begin by offering a brief overview of current scholarly
approaches to hermeneutics. Within New Testament scholarship,
current research focuses on the traditional philosophical questions of meaning and the nature of interpretation. Within
philosophy, however, there exists an increasing body of work
dedicated to untangling the relationship between Nazism and
Heidegger, the seminal ﬁgure who founded modern hermeneutics. This overview provides a foundation for exploring the way
that hermeneutical theory addresses both fundamental philosophical and political-social questions.
With this analysis completed, I will begin to make the case that
hermeneutics is fundamentally concerned with the nature of fascism
and genocide. I will look closely at the pervasive hermeneutical
debates about the Enlightenment and enlightened and technical
rationality. I will argue that these debates, for those engaging them,
were explicitly and self-consciously social and political in nature. For
ﬁgures like Heidegger, the Frankfurt School and Gadamer, the
critique of Enlightenment rationality was always both philosophical
and political-social. The critique of Enlightenment rationality was a
way of addressing political-social questions philosophically. Central
to hermeneutics was the claim that fundamental philosophical
critique was necessary to make sense of the most pressing issues of
the day. As Gadamer argued, hermeneutics represents “a thoughtful
mediation with contemporary life” (Gadamer, 1988: 150). In the
years between 1933 and the mid-1950s, there was no more pressing
issue than the prospects, nature and consequences of genocide and
fascism.
Current scholarship
The questions I seek to pose to hermeneutical theory tend to be
unasked by hermeneutical scholars, especially within the
discipline of biblical scholarship. Hermeneutical theory takes up
the question of interpretation or more speciﬁcally the structural
conditions that make interpretation possible. Pushed by feminism, scholars of colour and postcolonialists, literary critical
scholarship has been much more attentive to the way that
ideological issues can become woven into abstract positions. This
critical attention has not yet migrated back to the discipline of
hermeneutics.
Let us take as examples two recent, laudable works of
hermeneutical theory within the discipline of New Testament
studies, Porter and Stovel and Porter and Robinson. The ﬁrst
volume summarizes the major hermeneutical approaches to
meaning (Porter and Stovel, 2012: 9-23) while the second
introduces a wide range of hermeneutical thinkers and schools
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of thought (Porter and Robinson, 2011). In both instances, the
emphasis on meaning is in keeping with hermeneutics as it was
deﬁned in the traditional understanding of the seminal texts of
Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur. While there is engagement
with postmodernism and Derridean deconstruction (see Porter
and Robinson, 2011, Chapter 8), the postmodernist view is
presented as providing an especially radical answer to the speciﬁc,
hermeneutical question of the foundation of interpretation and
meaning rather than as offering a fundamental critique of the
seminal texts. While positing a particularly radical answer, this
analysis still assumes the centrality of the traditional question of
meaning. Neither volume addresses, in a systematic manner, the
connection between fascism and hermeneutics.
In both instances, the emphasis on meaning is in keeping with
hermeneutics as it was deﬁned in the seminal texts of Heidegger,
Gadamer and Ricoeur. While there is engagement with postmodernism and Derridean deconstruction (see Porter and Robinson,
2011, Chapter 8), the postmodernist view is presented as providing
an especially radical answer to the speciﬁc, hermeneutical question
of the foundation of interpretation and meaning. Current analysis
continues to see the question of meaning – whether stable,
inaccessible or somewhere in between – as the deﬁning question
of hermeneutics. Neither volume addresses, in a systematic manner,
the connection between fascism and hermeneutics.
Porter and Robinson do not shy away from the way that various
thinkers were entangled with the Nazi regime (see 50, 59, 76, 107,
133–134), and point to a recent biography of Gadamer, which covers
the Nazi era in great detail. Unfortunately, there is little attempt to
integrate these biographical facts into the analysis and, in the end,
they are no more relevant than other biographical data such as year
of birth or undergraduate institution. Engagement with Nazism is,
for Porter and Robinson, an interesting biographical fact that has
little signiﬁcance for the thought of various hermeneutical scholars.
Their reading of Gadamer’s Truth and Method is rich, philosophically informed and engaging on a variety of levels, but one does not
entertain the possibility that it could be a response to Nazism. My
reading of Gadamer will be quite different in this respect.
These omissions are most revealing in Porter and Robinson’s
reading of Heidegger, which strikes me as the weakest part of
their otherwise outstanding volume. Their analysis of Heidegger’s
Nazism is disappointingly tentative and tepid. “(Heidegger’s)
speciﬁc political beliefs have been debated by scholars, but his
involvement with Nazism is undisputed … Yet despite his
political involvements, Heidegger continues to ﬁnd vast audiences
around the world” (59). There exist three recent and extremely
widely read biographies that grapple with Heidegger’s Nazism
(Ott, Farias, Safranksi) and these biographies, whatever their
differences, reveal that Heidegger’s Nazism is one of modern
philosophy’s most difﬁcult and pressing problems. It is, frankly,
shocking that Porter and Robinson discuss the Grondin
biography of Gadamer and never even allude to any of the
biographies of Heidegger. The debates about Heidegger’s Nazism
have been heated enough to spill over into the popular press (see
Kelley, n. 6, pp 228–229) and have played a crucial role in two
decades of Heidegger scholarship. The omission of this debate is
both unfortunate and revealing about the unwillingness of New
Testament-inspired hermeneutics to engage the question of the
interface of hermeneutics and fascism/genocide.
Even more pressing is the omission of any discussion of the
growing body of philosophical critiques of Heideggerian fascist
thought. If there have been multiple biographies of Heidegger’s life
there has been a two-decade-long explosion of scholarship on
Nazism in Heidegger’s thought, none of which makes its way into
their analysis. While they do mention that many theologians have
avoided him because of his atheism and involvement with National
Socialism (71), they do not name names or discuss how his thought
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may (or may not) be infected by his political engagement. They are
far more critical of his philosophical incoherence (70) than they are
of his fascism. At the very least it would have been helpful to point
the reader towards some of the philosophically grounded critiques of
Heideggerian fascism. With that in mind, I shall highlight some of
the recent twists and turns in this ongoing debate.
Throughout the mid-1980s it was possible to see Heidegger as a
philosopher primarily concerned with the question of meaning
and of being who also made some short-term but quite foolish
political choices. That position fell apart with the biographical
research of Farias and especially Ott, who demonstrated that
Heidegger’s commitment was deeply felt and spilled over to his
thought. After the initial furor, a large number of philosophers
offered careful, thoughtful, detailed readings of Heidegger’s texts.
These diverse scholars re-read Heidegger’s thought in light of his
political commitments and the ever-increasing number of
available texts, lectures, speeches and seminars. Especially in
American scholarship, a whole new picture of Heidegger began to
emerge (for my analysis, see Kelley, 2002: 89–95). This debate
continues without resolution, as can be seen in the three recent
scholarly works of Emmanuel Faye, James Phillips and Charles
Bambach. These three works, which were published after my last
foray into the issue, show that the debate continues to rage within
philosophy.
These three volumes echo debates that have raged around
Heidegger since the end of the war. Emmanuel Faye offers the
most recent version of Adorno’s argument that Heidegger’s
thought is fascist down to its innermost core. He identiﬁes
philosophical support for the following Nazi ideas: eugenics (68–
69, 179), the Führer cult (77–78, 105, 121, 133, 139–140), military
conquest (81–82, 143–144, 270–271), the superiority of völkisch
thought over humanistic thought (90–92), explicit racism (100,
102, 110, 158, 169–170, 273–282, 284–289, 300–301), the Nazi,
racist state (115–119, 125, 208–215, 221–224), the SS (123),
persecution of the enemy (129, 152–154), the need to align the
law to Nazi principles (154–158, 173–202, 205–208), and racial
selection and genocide (244–246, 258–262, 271–272). For Faye,
Heidegger’s thought is so compromised that his philosophy is
reducible to Nazism. James Phillips, on the other hand, follows
the long-held position that emphasizes the disjunction between
Heidegger and fascism. Phillips sees a “convergence” but “not an
identity” between the Heideggerian and Nazi views (Phillips,
2005: 130). Phillips asks us to recognize that Heidegger’s embrace
of Nazi terminology and views included, alongside proximity, the
seeds of a rupture with Nazism. If Faye collapses Heidegger into
Nazism, and Phillips emphasizes the distance between Heidegger’s private National Socialism and the policies of the Hitler
regime, Charles Bambach asks not whether he was a Nazi but
instead what sort of National Socialist he was (Bambach, 2003:
xviii). Answering this question requires carefully reconstructing a
range of thinkers on the radical right and then locating
Heidegger’s thought within this larger debate. For Bambach,
Heidegger is both working within the orbit of the Naziﬁed radical
right and struggling to articulate his own position, often in
opposition to other elements of the radical right (for an initial
summary of his claims, see xxiv–xxv).
Before concluding this section on current scholarship, it is worth
mentioning one more aspect of the inexhaustible Heidegger affair.
Beginning in 1931, Heidegger kept “Black Notebooks” reﬂecting his
nascent and underdeveloped ideas. These notebooks, which will
soon be published, are rumored to contain further evidence of
Heidegger’s political views and anti-Semitism. Peter Trawney, the
volume’s editor, has come to argue that Heidegger was far more
anti-Semitic than had been realized and believed deeply in the
existence of an international Jewish conspiracy dedicated to the
destruction of the West. Clearly this debate has yet to run its course.

A large number of very thoughtful and careful philosophical
arguments have been offered that try to re-read Heidegger’s
thought in light of his political commitments and the everincreasing number of available texts, lectures, speeches and
seminars given during the Nazi era. Despite their differences, all
three approaches show that philosophers are examining Heidegger’s thought for its engagement with fascism and genocide.
A similar confrontation should take place with the discipline that
Heidegger helped to create: Hermeneutics.
The Holocaust and the critique of Enlightenment rationality
In this section I will look at three foundational hermeneutical
ﬁgures whose lives and thought were profoundly shaped, in
very different ways, by the Nazi era. All three made very
different political choices but all shaped their responses to this
disruptive era in the same way: through the critique of
instrumental rationality. There was hardly agreement on the
political analysis, with Heidegger embracing fascism, the
Frankfurt School embracing socialism and Gadamer decrying
the politicization of the Western tradition. I do wish to show,
however, that there is surprising similarity in the structure of
analysis. In each instance, the central assumption was that the
political crisis of the Weimar and Nazi eras reﬂected and grew
out of a profound philosophical/hermeneutical crisis. The
political situation, grave as it was, was but a symptom of a
deeper philosophical-spiritual cause. It was philosophy’s urgent
task to address that deeper spiritual crisis and, by doing so, the
philosophers were explicitly and self-consciously addressing the
political crisis of the day.
In addition to sharing this fundamental belief that the political
crisis grows out of, and reﬂects, deeper spiritual-philosophical
currents, all the thinkers being analysed share a remarkably
similar structure of analysis. They all assume a historical narrative
with several crucial time markers – a time of purity, a fateful
misstep setting in motion inevitable decline. The moment of
purity and the initial missteps both occurred in the realm of the
ancient Greeks, while the decline was greatly accelerated by the
Enlightenment. Drawing on longstanding anti-Enlightenment
sentiment, all three thinkers criticized the Enlightenment for
elevating scientiﬁc, instrumental reason above all else, grounding
knowledge in the autonomous human subject, and opening the
doors to atomism, rootlessness, alienation and reiﬁcation. With
these fateful missteps, modernity took a wrong turn that
culminated in the crisis of Weimar, fascism and genocide. They
address genocide by analysing and critiquing Enlightenment
rationality and by tracing the error back to its origins.
I shall very brieﬂy summarize the position of each thinker
before providing supporting and textual evidence. Heidegger’s
embrace of Nazism will revolve around his critique of Enlightenment, instrumental rationality (which he sees as the cause of
the current intellectual and political crisis), which he sees as
growing out of ﬂaws inherent in Western metaphysics going back
to the Greeks. For Gadamer, the most pressing problem is to
rehabilitate the great Western tradition from the taint of fascism
and genocide. This rehabilitation project was grounded in
Gadamer’s critique of Enlightenment, instrumental rationality,
which he sees a growing out of ﬂaws inherent in Western
metaphysics. In the course of their analysis, Horkheimer and
Adorno offered a philosophical critique of the ground fascism,
which they trace to ﬂaws in Enlightenment, instrumental
rationality, which is itself a product of tensions and ﬂaws in
Western thought going back to the Greeks. I hope that this analysis
will encourage my reader to ask whether the critique of
instrumental reason is adequate to the task of confronting the
essence of fascism and genocide.
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Heidegger
There has never been any doubt that Martin Heidegger, founder
of modern hermeneutics, was a member of the Nazi party and a
vocal and public supporter of Hitler. The question has been what
to make of these actions. The recent research of Ott, Farias and
Safranski reveals the depth of Heidegger’s commitment in
painstaking, careful detail. These actions include instituting Nazi
educational and racial policies (Ott, 1993: 169; Farias, 1989: 119;
Faye, 2009: 43–46; Heidegger, 1993a: 34), sending fawning
telegrams to high-ranking Nazis (Ott, 1993: 169–175) and giving
a number of high-proﬁle political speeches (see Wolin, 1993: 40–
66). These speeches employ explicitly Nazi language and imagery
(that is, Volk, race, destiny, Führer, racial community, hardness,
discipline, struggle) that enthusiastically endorsed Nazi policies as
they heaped praise upon Nazi martyrs, the regime, student
radicals and Hitler himself. While he did not engage in the sort of
public anti-Semitism that was so dominant at the time, there is a
signiﬁcant amount of evidence of anti-Semitic sentiment on his
part (see Lang, 1996: 36–38, 70–72; Grondin, 2003: 69–70;
Safranski, 1998: 257).
Heidegger sought to gain control of the university and use it as
a base for seizing control of the National Socialist reorganization
of the university system (Safranski, 1998: 235–238). Given his
view that political reality reﬂected deeper metaphysical foundations, his ambition is simply breathtaking. By taking control of his
university, and using it as a base to reform all the German
universities, his goal was nothing less than to ground the National
Socialist revolution in his hermeneutical phenomenology and
thereby take control of the revolution. His ambition was to turn
the Nazi era into a hermeneutical one.
As Heidegger’s thought wove its way down and through
various pathways, his position on the Enlightenment and
Enlightenment rationality remained consistent. He was against
them both. This opposition worked itself out in a variety of
complex and oft-changing ways, but it was invariably connected
to both crucial aspects of his thought and to his (again, oftchanging) political analysis. The Enlightenment becomes, for
him, an all-purpose explanation – it explains why democracy
fails, why the Nazi revolution was necessary, why the revolution
failed and why the authentic but failed revolution committed
genocide. I will draw attention, in an overly brief manner, to two
moments where Heidegger’s critique was related explicitly to the
question of fascism or, later, genocide.
Heidegger’s revolution and Enlightenment rationality. Heidegger’s early thought attempts to reconﬁgure the relationship
between self and world, a relationship that Heidegger is convinced
has been badly misunderstood since the inception of Western philosophy (for my analysis, see Kelley, 96–100). The problem stems
from the human desire to ﬂee from the ﬂux of human existence and
seek refuge in an illusory permanence. For Heidegger the vast
majority of Western philosophy has taken the wrong path and has
obscured, rather than clariﬁed, the structure of existence (see Kisiel,
1995: 156, van Buren, 1994: 141). Western Philosophy has set us on
the wrong path and the result is mistaken categories that produce
further confusion and errors, most especially the twin errors of the
autonomous subject and the elevation of science as a mode of reasoning, producing instrumental reason, objectiﬁcation and reiﬁcation. The attempt to identify and solve this problem forms the
backbone of what the early Heidegger deﬁnes as the hermeneutics of
facticity as found in his unpublished but reconstructed early lectures
and in Being and Time. Hermeneutical philosophy requires a double
move: the destruction of the ﬂawed tradition and, once the chaff has
been cleared away, the proper reconstruction of the ontological
conditions of human existence in the world.
4

Initially, then, hermeneutics was not about interpretation at all
but was deeply tied to Heidegger’s developing phenomenology of
human existence. It was, for Heidegger, a way of doing
philosophy without falling prey to the temptation of reiﬁcation
and objectiﬁcation that emerged out of a failed philosophical
tradition. The ﬂaws, for Heidegger, started in the ancient world
and have only snowballed over the years. The key turning point,
which is behind the current crisis, is the Enlightenment with its
enshrinement of the autonomous subject, its elevation of
technological reason, and its embrace of the Natural Sciences
and the value and method of objectivity and of objectiﬁcation.
The roots of the problem reside deep in the origins of Western
Philosophy, but it is with the Enlightenment that thought took a
fateful turn and established the conditions for the doomed world
of modernity. Philosophy can only gain its footing if it is able to
get behind and then beyond the instrumental reasoning that
emerged out of the Enlightenment. Society may be in a state of
chaos and decay (and it is worth recalling that Heidegger is
writing during the chaotic Weimar years), but this chaos and
decay is but a symptom of a deeper problem. Without addressing
the fundamental, ontological problem, modernity will continue to
bounce from horrible crisis to horrible crisis. What is required is a
philosophical revolution.
When the Nazi revolution explodes upon the scene, Heidegger
seizes the moment. For Heidegger, this conﬁguration of events
cannot be coincidental – the revolution on the political level must
reﬂect the profound spiritual revolution that he has been
initiating at the philosophical level. While others are ﬁghting
over mundane matters like book burnings and forced sterilization, Heidegger works to steer the revolution towards something
more primordial, fundamental and philosophical. He makes his
case in his inaugural address The Self-Assertion of the German
University. Authentic questioning, grounded in his thinking,
would replace the degraded, enlightened so-called thinking that
dominates modernity. He describes the West as a failing
“moribund, pseudocivilization”. The “spiritual strength of the
West” now “fails”, “starts to come apart at the seams” and
“collapses into itself” (Heidegger, 1993a: 38). This new thinking
will shatter the enlightened, scientiﬁc, discipline-based university
and create a new, spiritual people. “Questioning will then unfold
its ownmost power for disclosing the essence of all things … Such
questioning will shatter the encapsulation of the various ﬁelds of
knowledge into separate disciplines … If we will the essence of
science in the sense of the questioning, unsheltered standing ﬁrm
in the midst of the uncertainty of the totality of being, then this will
to essence will create for our Volk … a truly spiritual world”
(Heidegger, 1993a: 33, see also 37).
The crisis stems from a misreading that happened all the way
back in ancient Greece and the solution requires a return to the
Greeks. If in his early thought Heidegger located the error in
Plato and the solution in a certain reading of Aristotle, now he
pushes the original error back even further. The great beginning
of Western metaphysics occurred with the Greeks. “Only when
we submit to the power of the beginning of our spiritual historical
existence. This beginning is the beginning of Greek philosophy.
That is when, from the culture of one Volk and by the power of
that Volk’s language, Western man rises up for the ﬁrst time …
and questions” (Heidegger, 1993a: 31). This great Greek
beginning was misunderstood almost as soon as it occurred,
and it has seen nothing but decline ever since, with the
Enlightenment setting the philosophical errors in cement. His
Nazi revolution means repeating that great beginning, on a more
authentic level of originary questioning, and courageously
continuing this questioning. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, who
turned away from the originary moment, the German revolution
would, under Heidegger’s leadership, continue in the pure quest.
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With this radical questioning, a rootless people would ﬁnally
become rooted in their historical destiny. “Thus exposed to the
extreme questionableness of its own existence, this Volk has
the will to be a spiritual Volk” (Heidegger, 1993a: 35). If the
university needed to be reorganized, this entailed removing
the husk of a dead and decadent liberal humanism and its
ultimate tool, Enlightenment-inspired instrumental reason. Once
he made this commitment to join the revolution to better shape it,
all of the terrible political decisions and compromises inevitably
followed. The concentration camps, sterilization, anti-Semitic
laws and book burnings were a small price to pay for the chance
to restart Western philosophy anew.
Enlightenment reason and genocide. One of Heidegger’s central
post war topics involved technology as a reﬂection of ﬂawed,
Enlightenment-inspired modes of thinking. He had hoped that
the Nazi revolution would lead to a head-long confrontation and
resolution of this problem, but later came to see the Nazis as part
of the problem rather than the solution. He alludes to this in the
posthumously published interview in which he discusses the need
to develop an adequate relation to the essence of technology and
says, “National Socialism, to be sure, moved in this direction. But
those people were far too limited in their thinking to acquire an
explicit relationship to what is really happening today and has
been underway for three centuries” (Heidegger, 1993b: 111).
When he does discuss Nazism he sees it as either a failed confrontation with Enlightenment-produced technology or as an
example of said debasement of reason. In this context, he says the
following about the genocide (in the lecture that was later revised
into “The Question concerning Technology”): “Agriculture is
now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the
manufacture of corpses in the gas chamber and extermination
camps, the same as the blockade and starvation of the countryside, the same as the production of the hydrogen bombs” (quoted
in Lang, 1996: 16).
Heidegger addressed the issues of fascism and genocide and did
so by way of a critique of instrumental rationality. Before the rise
of Nazism, the political crisis of the Weimar era was but a
symptom of a deeper spiritual crisis brought about by Enlightenment rationality. During the Nazi era, the revolution was the
proper way to respond to the deeper spiritual crisis brought about
by Enlightenment rationality. After the war, the Nazi era came to
be a symptom of, rather than a solution to, the spiritual crisis
brought about by Enlightenment rationality. Even the genocide
itself is but a symptom of this deeper crisis. Of the three thinkers
we are examining in this paper, it is Heidegger who is the most
ripe for criticism. This is in large part because the best that one
can say is that his political judgments are disastrously erroneous
rather than, as many critics charge, actively malicious. Philosophically, his argument functions at a level of abstraction that is
deeply disturbing and is at odds with the hermeneutical concern
to avoid abstraction and focus on factical existence. When he is
not employing philosophical terms to defend the Nazi revolution
he is employing essentialized thinking that leads him to avert his
gaze from genocide in its speciﬁcity. By reducing the Holocaust to
a symptom of a deeper problem, Heidegger implies that the messy
details of the Holocaust are less signiﬁcant than the essence of
technology. This level of abstraction ensures that Heideggerian
hermeneutics is unable to think the Holocaust.
Gadamer
If Heidegger was an enthusiastic Nazi, the same cannot be said for
his student H.G. Gadamer, who was too benign a ﬁgure to be
seduced by his mentor’s foolishness. Gadamer, who worked with
Heidegger before the master moved to Freiberg, was as shocked

by his teacher’s revolutionary enthusiasm as Heidegger was
disappointed by his student’s refusal to seize the moment (see
Grondin, 2003: 154–156, 187–189). Once the Nazis seized power,
Gadamer’s temperament led him to keep a low proﬁle and to
make whatever accommodations with the current situation as
were necessary to maintain his career while refraining from
becoming complicit in the horrors around him. Unlike his fellow
hermeneuts, who explicitly wove their reﬂections on both fascism
and genocide into their thought, Gadamer chose the path of
silence. The universities had been thoroughly politicized in the
Nazi era, with approximately half of the professional philosophers
joining the party (Sluga, 1993: 7) and major ﬁgures straining to
show that their particular school of philosophy provided the best
ground for the Nazi revolution (see Sluga, 1993: 81–100, 125–153;
Faye, 2009: 151–202, 224–237). In the wake of this, a number of
post-war intellectuals untainted by Nazism publicly called for a
decade(s)-long period when the universities were either closed or
ruled by the occupying powers (Grondin, 2003: 241), fearing that
the same forces that produced Nazism would prove to be
incapable of resisting the lure of authoritarianism and fascism.
Gadamer, who was both in Germany and untainted by explicit
collaboration, was well positioned to emerge as a post-war
academic leader who was free from the stain of collusion.
Gadamer gave a number of speeches in which he laid out his
vision of German cultural and intellectual life that could emerge
from the ashes of moral collapse and total military defeat.
According to Grondin (2003: 243–252), a number of key themes
emerge from his vision of a revived German intellectual world.
In these lectures he sought to rehabilitate the tainted tradition and
to challenge those intellectual tendencies that had sullied the
tradition in the ﬁrst place: the instrumentalization and politicization of thought, which encouraged intellectuals to discard the
quest for truth and to serve a corrupt political regime; and the
tendency for Romantic longing, which had left intellectuals and
German culture open to the lure of racial mystiﬁcation.
In particular, he identiﬁed Romantic longing as paving the way
for the catastrophe. “This seems to me one of the most decisive
tasks that scholarship can perform for the whole: educating the
Germans to reality. Romantic longing must be driven out of our
youth and our people once and for all” (quoted in Grondin, 2003:
246). As he sought to drive out Romantic nationalism from the
discourse, he also gave a number of lectures on what he saw as the
best of the German tradition. The challenge would be to ﬁnd a
way to revive that tradition without discarding the literary in the
name of Enlightenment rationality but without also indulging in
dangerous Romanticization. This task would form the horizon
out of which would emerge his magnum opus: Truth and Method.
The foundational text of the discipline of hermeneutics was
written as a response to fascism and genocide with the discipline
emerging as the best way to avoid relapsing into the horror.
Gadamer’s explanation for this sorry state of affairs should be
rather familiar by now. The problem that forms the backbone of
Truth and Method is Enlightenment rationality, which is itself
rooted in ﬂaws in the metaphysical tradition that goes back to the
Greeks. In his reading, these ﬂaws can be traced back to a
misreading of Aristotle, a misreading corrected by the young
Heidegger before his foolish Nazi turn. The solution comes with
an authentic confrontation with the great works of the Western
tradition, a confrontation tainted by neither objectiﬁcation nor
politicization. This confrontation can only take place after we
have discarded the ﬂawed interpretive stance that is rooted in
instrumental rationality.
Because of the Enlightenment, rationality has been reduced to
science and mathematics and art and the human sciences have
been reduced to silence or misconceived. This is central to
Gadamer’s analysis. According to Gadamer, scientiﬁc rationality
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and its heirs produce thought that is fragmented and “strangely
detached” (xv), “ossiﬁed” (375), estranged (149), alienated and
alienating (280) and “depends on a process of abstraction” (76).
This abstraction produces “epistemological dogmatism” and
“dogmatic abstractions” (81–82). “It is the aim of science to so
objectify experience that it no longer contains any historical
element” (311). The volume opens and closes with his rejection of
scientiﬁc reasoning. In the Introduction he asks what kind of
truth and insight can come from art and then says, “In the face
of the dominant position of modern science in the philosophical
clariﬁcation and justiﬁcation of the concept of knowledge and the
concept of truth, this question does not appear legitimate” (xi).
The ﬁnal paragraph of the book concludes that “the certainty that
is imparted by the use of scientiﬁc methods does not sufﬁce to
guarantee truth” (446) because “what the tools of method does
not achieve must … be achieved by a discipline of questioning
and research, a discipline that guarantees truth” (447). It also
ﬁnds its way into the title, where truth in the form of art and the
Western tradition is placed alongside and ultimately in opposition to the enlightened, scientiﬁc rationality of method. Drenched
in instrumental reasoning, method is alien to the human sciences
and should not have become the yardstick for thinking about art
and the intellectual tradition and heritage. The impoverished
methodological tradition can be traced back to Kant and the
Enlightenment. Kant’s thought “constituted a turning point” in
the doomed desire to model the human sciences on the natural
sciences (38). “The importance of this cannot be easily overestimated, for what was here surrendered was that element in
which literary and historical studies lived” (38). As a result of this
turn to Enlightenment, “the human sciences lost its justiﬁcation”
(38–39). Gadamer’s argument goes something like this: the
Enlightenment led to the triumph of the scientiﬁc method as the
sole and legitimate form of human knowledge. This limiting of
human knowledge to scientiﬁc methodology led to the “selfannihilation” of the human sciences (19).
The Romantic rebellion against Enlightenment’s scientism
seems to offer a way out, but Gadamer demurs. He argues that it
remains excessively rooted in Kant and Enlightenment thinking.
“Romantic hermeneutics and history found a point of contact for
their self-understanding only in the concept of genius stressed by
Kant’s aesthetics” (39). As a result, “the romantic critique of the
Enlightenment ends up in Enlightenment” (244). By rooting itself
in the inward experience of the autonomous individual,
romanticism aesthetics and historiography produces the subjectivisation of the aesthetic experience (39–73), thereby closing
off the possibility of artistic truth (73–90). The Enlightenment
brings with it a form of subjectivism that carries “destructive
consequence(s)” (85), as does the Romantic rebellion against
Enlightenment.
The scientiﬁc method produces a stance of distanciation:
isolated subjects dissecting moribund objects rather than factical
Dasein encountering a living world. It presumes and leads to
intellectual and ultimately social alienation, atomism and
rootlessness. There is a direct line from the elevation of science,
the distancing effect inherent in the scientiﬁc method, a
subjectivist rebellion, and the alienation and historical confusion
that result (see 211–214). The solution, then, to the problem of
social alienation and its negative social effects can be found in
providing the human sciences with a theoretical foundation that
is essential to its nature. The problem is Enlightenment and its
major tool of instrumental rationality and the solution is
philosophical hermeneutics. It is hermeneutics that can free
modernity from the philosophical errors and from the horrifying
cultural/political events that grow out of these errors. Meditating
on the phenomenological structure of interpretation may not
seem like a proper response to the horrors of the Nazi era and the
6

genocide, but, according to Gadamer, without such philosophical
reﬂection we are bound to repeat the horrors anew.
The challenge is to develop a view of art and its interpretation
that manages to avoid the twin pitfalls of positivistic objectivism
and romantic subjectivism, and the solution is to be found in a
Heideggerian phenomenology (225–234). His goal is to “enquire
into the mode of being” of the experience of art, an experience
that does not leave the subject unchanged (89). He also argues
that this analysis has implications well beyond the realm of art,
giving hermeneutical theory a comprehensive breadth well
beyond the aesthetic realm (146). This framework forms the
foundation for most of his major theoretical achievements:
the hermeneutical circle, the fusion of horizons, the avoidance of
the aesthetic consciousness, the rehabilitation of prejudice and
tradition. These seminal ideas, all central tenets of the discipline
of hermeneutics, emerge out of Gadamer’s reaction to the Nazi
era as deﬁned by instrumental rationality and romanticized
enthusiasm. The hermeneutical circle (235–237) avoids the
pitfalls of objectiﬁcation. The dialogue implicit in the hermeneutical circle provides interpretation and textual encounter with its
ontological-hermeneutical structure that is preferable to the
detached observer dissecting dead objects. The rehabilitation of
prejudice, which gives presuppositions a productive role in the
creation of knowledge, avoids the Enlightenment’s embrace of
objectivity and afﬁrms the historical nature of human existence.
The hermeneutical circle allows him to go beyond romantic
aesthetics and the aesthetic consciousness. The aesthetic consciousness is as much an abstraction as the distancing that comes
with the scientiﬁc method (72, 76), and produces alienation every
bit as severe as the alienation produced by the scientiﬁc method
(75). He rejects the historiographical goal of the objective
reconstruction of the past (336–338) that participates in Enlightenment, objectivist errors. Instead he argues for the fusion of
horizons, which he sees as providing an ontological, hermeneutical ground for historical inquiry.
In what is most relevant to our discussion, Gadamer is eager to
redeem the seemingly tainted notion of tradition. In the
immediate postwar era he was eager to redeem tradition from
its association with racism and Nazism. While the connection to
Nazism is no longer in the foreground, his concern with
redeeming tradition remains strong in Truth and Method and,
once again, it is done by way of a critique of instrumental reason.
In the wake of the Enlightenment, tradition has been seen as
antithetical to (instrumental) reason and aligned with the
negative force of prejudice (240). The romantic revolt is no more
satisfactory in that it accepts the reason/tradition divide and
elevates the formerly scorned half of the dichotomy (250). Rather
than being a static object to be dissected, it is constantly created
and recreated in the course of the encounter. Despite the
distortions of dictatorial regimes (n. 187, page 524), tradition
possesses authority only to the extent that it possesses wisdom
and that its wisdom is properly encountered and accepted.
In each instance, Gadamer’s thought seeks to identify how the
Enlightenment has left us intellectually impoverished and even
opened the door to a whole range of horrors, from alienation to
dictatorship. He has tried to work through the various
dichotomies and replace them with a philosophically sound
historical hermeneutics. Unlike his mentor, Gadamer made every
effort to stay clear of political entanglement, but it is not clear that
the crisis produced by the Nazi era stayed clear of him. In
particular, his rehabilitation of both prejudice and of notions of
National Tradition reveals blind spots to his approach. It is not so
much that he is implicated in the racism of the Nazism by
rehabilitating the notion of prejudice in the hermeneutical
process. It is rather that, after the searing experience of Nazism
and of other forms of modern racial prejudice, it seems woefully
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inadequate to say that all that is required is an open mind and a
willingness to enter the hermeneutical circle. There is more wrong
with prejudice than a closed hermeneutical stance, and hermeneutics lacks the means for a full and thoughtful confrontation
with the wide range of prejudice and the damage that it can bring.
The same ﬂaw is found in Gadamer’s reﬂections upon notions of
the tradition. His hermeneutical reﬂections here are not without
insight, and he is careful to separate authentic tradition (as an
ongoing dialogue) from the sort of crass cultural nationalism that
supported Nazism. But, once again, he is not terribly helpful in
providing a way to identify where a tradition goes off the rails and
how to confront it; nor is he particularly clear on the more
problematic link he draws between a cultural tradition and an
ethnic group. He is in danger of embracing a more elevated form of
cultural nationalism. At the very least, his thought does little to
help us escape from such a fate.
Furthermore, despite the many differences between himself
and Heidegger, his thought is open to many of the same criticisms
that have been articulated above. While his hermeneutical theory
is hardly reducible to a displaced response to Nazism, there exists
a profound connection between his intellectual and aesthetic
project and the atrocities carried out in the name of the German
tradition that he so admires. His hermeneutical theory – with its
emphasis on overcoming the dichotomies bequeathed by the
Enlightenment and its attempt at overcoming alienation and
atomism – represents his confrontation with the crisis of
modernity, which includes Nazism and its after effect. Unlike
Heidegger, he is not directly addressing the genocide, but he is
clearly envisioning an alternative approach to history, art, culture
and the Western tradition, an alternative that would help us avoid
another brush with fascism and genocide. The problem here, as
with Heidegger, is that by focusing so heavily on the roots and
origins and essences, he encourages us to look away from
genocide and fascism in their speciﬁcity.
The Frankfurt School
The members of the Frankfurt School did not have the
opportunity to become Nazi enthusiasts, nor did they have the
option of quietly riding out the war free from dangerous or
disreputable political entanglement. The mostly Jewish and
entirely socialist scholars who made up the Frankfurt School
were not destined to last long in Hitler’s racial utopia. Upon
Hitler’s rise to power various members of the school went into
hiding, eventually setting up a semi-permanent exile in New York
City, loosely aligned with Columbia University. Of all of the
theorists we are looking at, their philosophy was the most
explicitly and thoroughly political. From their perch in the United
States, they waged a relentless intellectual war against the
foundations of Nazism, producing major studies on prejudice
and anti-Semitism, the Authoritarian Personality, and Nazi
political and legal theories. They also wrote major philosophical
works that overlap to a signiﬁcant degree with our topic and
deserve careful attention. One might be tempted to observe that
the hermeneutical ﬂaws identiﬁed above are limited to the
phenomenologists – to Heidegger and his student Gadamer.
The hermeneutical position of the Frankfurt School suggests
otherwise.
In particular they see fascism as reﬂecting a deeper crisis of
modernity, primarily because of the ubiquity of instrumental
rationality – a crisis that is ultimately rooted in antiquity. It is
Adorno who quips that Heidegger’s thought is fascist down to its
core, yet the structure of their critique bears striking resemblance to
that of the phenomenologists. Like Heidegger and Gadamer before
them, members of the Frankfurt School were profoundly shaped by
Nazism and developed a critique whereby the current phenomenon

of fascism is but a symptom of a deeper philosophical error.
The two most inﬂuential founders of the Frankfurt School,
Horkheimer and Adorno, do develop a philosophical argument
that is strikingly phenomenological.
For Horkheimer and Adorno, Jewish-German exiles and
authors of the brilliantly infuriating Dialectics of Enlightenment,
the best way to confront the horrors of fascism and genocide is by
rethinking the Enlightenment, broadly deﬁned, and by tracing the
roots of the Enlightenment’s failings back to the ancient Greeks.
This theory may seem counterintuitive, given their radical
socialism, their embrace of empiricism, their critical analysis of
popular culture, their exile from Germany, and their contempt for
Heidegger. Adorno penned an acerbic assault on Heideggerian
existentialism, accusing Heidegger of using philosophy to
universalize capitalism, fascism and maudlin folksy nationalism
(Adorno, 1973: 19–20, 25, 55–60, 71, 76, 92–120). Despite these
differences, Horkheimer and Adorno do embrace a philosophical
narrative as a way of explaining fascism and genocide that is
remarkably similar to that of Heidegger and Gadamer. They all
produce a common narrative in which the Enlightenment, as the
fulﬁlment of all that is wrong with Western thought, is the
ultimate source of the genocide.
For Horkheimer and Adorno, fascism is an enemy that must be
confronted and defeated. To defeat fascism requires seeing it as
part of modernity and, therefore, as grounded in the dialectics of
Enlightenment. The goal of thought must be to ﬁnd forms of
rationality that are precluded by the Enlightenment reduction of
reason to technical rationality. Once again this involves tracing
this reduction back to its roots in Greek antiquity, the ultimate
source of what inspires and dooms modernity. Horkheimer and
Adorno differ from the phenomenologists by tracing the
originary Greek moment back to myth rather than philosophy.
Rather than being a source of liberation, the Enlightenment’s
promise to liberate humanity from myth, from fantasy and from
fear (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 1) includes within it a dark
side in that it also installs humanity as master over nature and over
each other (ibid). The result is a “wholly enlightened earth” that is
“radiant with triumphant calamity” (ibid). The scientiﬁc mind
conquers superstition and in the process “rules over disenchanted
nature” (2). Enlightenment thought never learned the joy of
understanding but only “the method of exploitation” of nature and
of others (ibid). The violence at the heart of the Enlightenment
assault on myth leads to an entire range of violent thought and
actions, rejecting anything “that does not conform to the standard
of calculation and utility” (3). “Enlightenment is totalitarian” (4)
because it has granted unlimited power to calculating thought (67–
8), multiplying violence upon violence (33). In the process it reiﬁed
thought, “aping the machine it has produced itself” (19). Nazism,
which pays tribute to the Enlightenment as it claims to free itself
from it (37), is but one form taken by modern totalitarianism (43).
Like Heidegger before them, Horkheimer and Adorno see a direct
line from Enlightenment principles to instrumental reason to social
and political catastrophe.
For Heidegger and Gadamer, the Enlightenment itself grows
out of ﬂaws in the Western tradition than can be traced back to
the ancient Greeks. Horkheimer and Adorno state something
remarkably similar, arguing that the Enlightenment’s mode of
thought may be thoroughly modern but that it has its roots in the
origins of Western thought. If Heidegger and Gadamer locate the
problem in unfortunate features of formative philosophy,
Horkheimer and Adorno locate it in the realm of myth and its
reception. This is partly because they identify philosophy, since its
inception in Plato and Aristotle, with claims to universality and
therefore to domination (16). But it is also because they locate
within mythology the power to both enslave and liberate. If the
historical Enlightenment is totalitarian, it is within mythology, or
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at least within Homer’s articulation of mythology, that one ﬁnds
the dialectic of Enlightenment. For the process of objectiﬁcation is
already “far advanced in the Homeric epic” (11) and “the Odyssey
as a whole bears witness to the dialectical of Enlightenment” (34).
It is Homer who sets in motion the process that culminates in the
totalitarianism of modern science and, eventually, genocide.
There are also, in Homer, the seeds for rebellion against
Enlightenment’s totalitarian nature. The dialectic remains, since
Odysseus “achieves his estrangement from nature by abandoning
himself to nature” (38). In Homer there exists unity through
multiplicity rather than simply the triumph of the universal over
the particular (as in later, undialectical Enlightenment). The
Enlightenment, however, is based on the fear of the mythical and
the ensuing desire to expel the mythical from the realm of reason.
The dialectic is destroyed in the quest for monolithic unity as the
Gods and the primal, including nature, are to be violently
excluded. The Enlightenment exists in a state of terror in the face
of the mythic (22), with the mythic here being conceived quite
broadly. It is ambiguity itself that is the ultimate target of the
Enlightenment. Fascism is ultimately rooted in the fear of
ambiguity and that fear has taken hold because Western
Philosophy is structured around eliminating ambiguity. Fascism
is but one symptom of this ancient desire.
Fascism is the enemy and the authors are withering in their
critique. Yet fascism remains a particularly archaic surface reﬂection
of deeper powers that can be traced back to the Enlightenment
impulse (18, 22, 30, 33, 37). These same forces create other forms of
totalitarianism, including ruthless capitalism (43) and American
popular culture, which withers the imagination (100). Fascism is
distinguished from other totalitarianisms by its extremism and by its
vacuity (172). It also includes two other distinctive factors, antiSemitism and genocide, both of which are rooted in the Enlightenment itself. Understandably, the topic of anti-Semitism receives
considerably more attention from Horkheimer and Adorno (2002:
137–172) than from either Gadamer (where it is never broached) or
Heidegger (where one can ﬁnd disturbing traces of anti-Semitism).
In their complex argument, the image of the Jew is constructed to
serve a number of purposes: to embody all that the fascist regime
fears (165) and to embody the economic exploiter and thereby
distract the populace from capitalism’s structural exploitation (143).
Like all else in the modern world that does not ﬁt into the current
order, they must be rooted out (150). “As they designate obsolete
sections of the population for extermination the administrations of
totalitarian states are merely the executors of economic verdicts
passed long ago” (171). Long ago in this instance refers to the
Enlightenment because, ultimately, even the genocide is an
outgrowth of logic of Enlightenment. With the genocide, the
Enlightenment itself ﬁnally sought to “break through the limits of
Enlightenment” (172).
The Frankfurt School was particularly well positioned to avoid
the errors identiﬁed with the phenomenological branch of
hermeneutics. Their political commitments and empirical work
suggest that they are looking at rather than away from fascism
and genocide, while their empirical work suggests an approach
capable of avoiding the trap of essentialism. It is all the more
revealing that they too end up repeating the same hermeneutical
narrative that locates the essence of fascism and genocide in
instrumental rationality and ﬂaws located in the origins of the
Western tradition. For all their sophistication, they are unable to
escape the lure of this powerful narrative.
Conclusion
This paper presents a challenge to mainstream approaches to
hermeneutics, especially as appropriated by biblical scholarship.
Current hermeneutical theory has been quite attentive to speciﬁc
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philosophical questions about the fundamental nature of
rationality, meaning and interpretation. While these are important questions that require continued attention, the implication is
that socio-political questions are extraneous to ontological
analysis. I have demonstrated that issues ranging from alienation
to fascism and genocide were anything but peripheral to the work
of the discipline’s foundational ﬁgures. Current hermeneutical
theory should be as attentive to these sorts of questions as were
the foundational ﬁgures of the discipline. Mainstream hermeneutical theory, especially as envisioned by biblical scholars, needs
to open itself up to a much broader range of questions, issues and
perspectives.
Furthermore, the paper has identiﬁed problems with the
speciﬁc nature of the hermeneutical approach to matters of
interpretation and to fascism and genocide. The three thinkers/
schools of thought identiﬁed above possess substantial differences
in everything from their fundamental philosophical-aesthetic
outlook to their political commitments. They share remarkably
similar views about the ills of modernity (that is, alienation,
rootlessness) and a remarkably similar narrative on how these ills
came about. In this grand narrative, current political or social
problems are surface symptoms of a deeper spiritual crisis. This
spiritual crisis is caused by philosophical errors that go back to
the very roots of Western philosophy or literature. Finally, for all
three the Enlightenment represents a fateful step in the decline of
Western history when instrumental reason triumphed over all
else. The philosophical and the political side of the hermeneutical
project are deeply intertwined, which is why hermeneutical
theory can claim to identify the conditions that make textual
interpretation possible and, in the same step, free us from the ill
effects of modernity. The proper nature of meaning and
interpretation can only be discerned if Enlightenment-induced
errors are identiﬁed and circumvented. The same is true of
fascism and genocide.
Because this philosophical narrative is woven into both
philosophical and political questions, I would like to conclude
by summarizing some of the limitations that have been identiﬁed
through the course of my analysis.
(i) This paper has identiﬁed a number of problematic
philosophical issues. There is an unexamined teleological
assumption at work where ancient errors inevitably lead to a
modern nightmare. There is a related problematic view of
causality in which philosophical errors inevitably produce social
crisis while proper philosophical categories alone can produce a
healthy society. Finally, the view of the Enlightenment is entirely
one-sided and reductive. The oft-repeated return to the Enlightenment as an explanation for virtually all that has gone wrong
with modernity suggests unexamined animosity rather than
thoughtful engagement. Certainly there is more to the complex
historical phenomenon of Enlightenment than instrumental
reason and its ill effects.
This is not to suggest that the hermeneutical argument is not
without value. It is worth identifying Enlightenment’s dark side,
and, with a more nuanced and dialectical approach, hermeneutics
could initiate a productive conversation about the contradictory
effects of Enlightenment. In the same way, there is much to praise
in the critique of instrumental reason. Were the hermeneutical
position framed in less teleological and more empirical terms, the
critique of instrumental reason could be quite fruitful. The
challenge is to disentangle the central categories of hermeneutics
– from the hermeneutical circle to the productive role of
presuppositions – without overstating the pernicious effects of
instrumental reason.
(ii) The hermeneutical approach to genocide and fascism is
equally problematic. Central to my argument is the claim that the
critique of instrumental reason is offered as a way of confronting
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(or, in Heidegger’s case, defending) fascism. The analysis above
raises a number of questions about this as a way to confront
fascism and genocide. It is ultimately reductive to see genocide as
a mere reﬂection of a deeper spiritual problem. It is further
concerning that this position is unable to be attentive to fascism
and genocide in their speciﬁcity and is unable to explain why
individual genocides occur where and when they do. The
hermeneutical position is that instrumental reason produces
abstraction, alienation, ambiguity-hating universalism, atomization, isolation, technological supremacy, domination of nature,
and blindness to the truth of art and that fascism and genocide
somehow emerge out of this mixture. Within this way of thinking
there is no need to explain in detail the connections between the
various links in the chain. In the language of hermeneutics, this
approach reduces genocide to an abstraction rather than
identifying its facticity. It diverts our attention away from the
Holocaust itself without creating a dialogue with the Holocaust’s
reality. It is a hermeneutical approach that, on this point, eschews
the “to and fro” of the hermeneutical circle.
Once again, this is not to suggest that the hermeneutical
approach has nothing to offer Genocide Studies. Rather than
being an irrational irruption of atavistic rage, genocide is often
rigorously rational, and hermeneutics could play an extremely
helpful role in teasing out the forms of rationality being
employed. It could also connect genocidal rationalities to other
modern modes of rationality. This would be a very different sort
of analysis, more attuned to how genocidal modes of rationality
function than to genocide’s roots in antiquity. There is little of
this sort of analysis in current comparative Genocide Studies, and
hermeneutical theory would be particularly well situated to ﬁll
this scholarly gap.
There is a further problem as well. The hermeneutical
approach limits its attention to one aspect of genocide (that is,
its form of reasoning) while rendering invisible everything else
that makes genocide possible – from political structures to the
role of law to the relationship between racism/imperialism and
genocide. I suggest that New Testament scholars, including those
of us indebted to the hermeneutical project, look more directly at
the scholarly ﬁelds of Holocaust and comparative Genocide
Studies. These disciplines can provide an entire range of questions
and issues that will end up enriching both hermeneutics and the
discipline of Biblical Scholarship.
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